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Introduction 
 
This article will look at strategic convergences between India and Australia in Southeast 
Asia.    It will first examine the development of India’s strategic role in Southeast Asia and 
the trajectory of relations between Australia and India over the last decade or so.  It will 
then consider the convergence of India and Australia’s strategic interests in Southeast Asia 
and review opportunities for strategic cooperation in the region, including in the political 
diplomatic area and cooperation in maritime security.   Finally it will consider the idea of the 
“Indo-Pacific” as a single strategic region and the potential significance of this for the roles 
of Australia and India in Southeast Asia. 
 
Australia in India’s Look East Policy:  the trajectory of relations 
 
For much of their modern history, Australia and India have not had a close strategic 
relationship.  Despite a common language and some shared political traditions, Australia 
and India’s strategic perspectives have often been different.  This was particularly so during 
the Cold War, when India was a determined advocate of strategic autonomy and 
nonalignment and followed a policy of economic autarky.  In contrast, Australia was a loyal 
ally of the United States and based its prosperity on international trade.  India’s relationship 
with Australia broadly fit the pattern of its relations with many countries in Southeast Asia – 
divergent geopolitical perspectives, ideological differences and weak economic links.    But 
there were other factors as well that caused each side to neglect the relationship.1    In fact, 
Australia rarely figured in New Delhi’s security calculations, and when it did it was often 
considered as being merely a client state of the United States.2  For its part, Canberra did 
not see India as presenting any real threat to Australia, although there were some residual 
concerns about India’s security relationship with the Soviet Union and its implications for 
India’s role in Southeast Asia.3  During the 1980s, Australia, along with many ASEAN states, 
perceived – rightly or wrongly - that India’s recognition of the Vietnam-backed regime in 
Cambodia was driven by India’s relationship with the Soviet Union. 
 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union removed many irritants from 
the relationship, although different perspectives and misunderstandings continued for some 
years.   This was demonstrated by Australia’s strong reactions against India’s Pokhran II 
nuclear tests in 1998.  Australia and Japan led international condemnation of the tests, 
primarily motivated by a desire to safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation 
system.  This caused considerable resentment among many in Delhi, who believed that 
Australia, which had the benefit of extended nuclear deterrence from the US, trivialised 
India’s legitimate security concerns that had led it to become a declared nuclear weapons 
state. 
 
India’s Look East Policy 
 
When India launched its Look East policy in the depths of its post-Cold War economic crisis 
in the early 1990s, Southeast Asia soon became the primary focus of its policy.   India saw its 
inclusion in the regional political, economic and security groupings based in Southeast Asia 
as an important way to avoid marginalisation in the post-Cold War international landscape.  
India moved to improve bilateral security links with several Southeast Asian states and 
identified Singapore as its key gateway into the region.  India also sought to further develop 
links with its longstanding political ally, Vietnam.  These bilateral relationships have come to 
form the key points in India’s Southeast Asian strategy.  India has developed close security 
relationships with both Singapore and Vietnam, which include regular exercises, ship visits 
and intelligence sharing. 
 
In the late 1990s, India signalled a broadening of its Look East policy to the entire western 
Pacific basin. As Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh described it, “our Look East policy 
will be integrated into a larger regionalisation strategy which encompasses… the Asia 
Pacific.”4 The so-called “Phase 2” of the Look East policy involved a deepening of India’s 
relationships in Southeast Asia as well as expanding India’s focus to a broader region 
extending from Australia to Northeast Asia, and pursuing a broader agenda involving 
security cooperation.5  But while Australia may have formed a conceptual part of India’s 
Look East policy, India initially did little to operationalise the relationship.  Instead, it has 
focused its limited diplomatic resources on developing relationships with key partners in 
Southeast Asia and with Japan.  From New Delhi’s perspective, the development of 
economic and security links with Australia was not a priority:  Australia was not seen as 
adding much to the equation.  
 
Australia’s strategic perspectives on Southeast Asia 
 
Southeast Asia has been a primary strategic and economic focus for Australia for many 
decades.  The Southeast Asian archipelago has long been seen as the most likely route by 
which extra-regional powers might potentially present a security threat to Australia, just as 
Japan did in 1942.   Following World War II, Australia played an active security role in 
Southeast Asia as part of a policy of forward defence against communism.  This included 
providing substantial military forces to assist Malaya against its communist insurgency 
(1950-60) and during the Indonesian Konfrontasi (1962-66), supporting the United States as 
a member of SEATO during the Vietnam War (1962-73), and in stabilisation operations in 
the newly independent Timor Leste (1997- present).  Australia continues to have a formal 
security role in Southeast Asia through the Five Power Defence Arrangements with Malaysia 
and Singapore (and the related Integrated Area Defence System) which has been in place 
since the early 1970s.   Australia also has a growing bilateral defence and security 
relationship with Indonesia under the 2006 Lombok security treaty, which has maritime 
security cooperation and capacity building as a significant part of its focus. 
 
Since the early 1970s Australia has actively pursued closer political and economic relations 
with the region.   Australia, along with Japan, played an active role in promoting closer 
economic cooperation throughout the region, which led to the establishment of APEC in the 
1980s.  This was primarily driven by economics and the desire to promote regional trade 
liberalisation and integration.  But the idea of the Asia Pacific has always had a strong 
underlying security element:  keeping the United States as a benign offshore balancer and 
the main security provider to the region.   However groupings such as APEC were 
established without India.   The concept of the “Asia Pacific” was not then seen as extending 
to South Asia and there were concerns among some states that India’s participation might 
slow down the process of trade liberalisation.    Australia is now a major economic partner 
to ASEAN, with bilateral trade in goods and services exceeding A$92 billion in 2012-13.6   As 
a group, ASEAN is Australia’s largest trading partner. 
 
Changes in Australia’s perspectives on India 
 
Over the last decade or so, the extension of India’s strategic gaze eastwards has been 
complemented by Australia’s changing perspectives of India.  This reflected several factors.  
First was the increasing importance of India as a major regional power and potentially an 
important economic partner for Australia.  Second, was the strategic rapprochement 
between India and the United States which opened the prospect for changes in India’s 
policies that had previously inhibited security cooperation between India and US allies.  
Third, is the US policy of “rebalancing” its defence resources away from West Asia and 
towards East Asia, which in coming years will likely require Australia to take a more active 
security role throughout the Indian Ocean region.  Importantly, Australia has also seen the 
expansion of India’s strategic influence into areas such as Southeast Asia that were 
traditionally of key strategic concern for Australia.    
 
As a result of these developments, Australia now recognises India as a potentially important 
strategic partner in the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the Pacific.  As Australian Defence 
Minister, Stephen Smith, commented: 
 
“India’s rise as a world power is at the forefront of Australia’s foreign and strategic 
policy, as is the need to preserve maritime security in the Indian Ocean.  India and 
Australia, with the two most significant and advanced navies of the Indian Ocean rim 
countries, are natural security partners in the Indo-Pacific region.”7 
 
Since the turn of this century, Australia has made considerable efforts to develop a 
comprehensive strategic relationship with India, including numerous visits to India by 
Australian Prime Ministers and senior ministers.  This increased political engagement has led 
to a number of agreements on security-related matters, including a 2003 agreement on 
terrorism, a 2006 memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation, a 2007 defence 
information sharing arrangement and 2008 agreements on intelligence dialogue, extradition 
and terrorism.  In November 2009, Australia and India announced a Joint Declaration on 
Security Cooperation, intended to set out shared strategic perspectives and create a 
framework for the further development of bilateral security cooperation.  At the same time, 
then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd told an audience in New Delhi that India and Australia were 
“natural partners” and should become “strategic partners.”8    
 
The Australia-India Security Declaration is a non-binding declaration of principles and 
understandings in security matters.9    Australia has announced similar Security Declarations 
with Japan (in 2007) and South Korea (in 2009) and India announced a similar Security 
Declaration with Japan (in 2008).   The 2009 Security Declaration was a notable step for 
Australia and India in establishing a framework for the further development of the security 
relationship, including the formalisation of regular consultations and dialogues between 
senior ministers, senior military and diplomatic representatives and joint working groups on 
maritime security operations and counter-terrorism and immigration.  In conjunction with 
the Security Declaration, Australia and India have finalised new cooperation arrangements 
in intelligence, law enforcement, border security, terrorist financing and money laundering.     
 
This has led to a considerable expansion in bilateral dialogues over the last few years, 
including  regular meetings of foreign and defence ministers and high level officials.  There 
has also been a considerable increase in visits and exchanges at the military to military level 
and the Indian and Australian navies, in particular, are looking for ways to further develop 
their relationship.   The two navies engage in regular passage exercises (so-called 
“PASSEXs”) and regular bilateral exercises (which will probably focus on anti-submarine 
warfare) will commence in 2015.10    
 
Australia is gradually coming to see India as an important element in its security.  Most 
strategic analysts in Australia now see the underlying strategic interests of Australia and 
India as “essentially congruent”11  and that there is significant scope for bilateral security 
cooperation between Australia and India.   Some Indian commentators also see potential for 
a maritime security partnership between India and Australia that spans the entire Indo-
Pacific.12  Others regard Australia merely as a potentially useful junior partner in an informal 
coalition with the United States to balance against China.13   Certainly, New Delhi has been 
somewhat more cautious than Canberra about developing the relationship.  To some extent 
this simply reflects a matter of priorities:  from India’s perspective Australia is a middle 
power that lies beyond the immediate arc of East Asia.  Australia is neither a potentially 
important peer state such as Japan nor a small and useful “gateway” state such as 
Singapore.  While there is some recognition of the potential for cooperation, there is not yet 
a recognition that Australia is an important element in India’s security.   New Delhi sees the 
United States as a key strategic partner, but sees less need to invest in its relationship with 
Canberra.   Although Australia is, along with Indonesia, one of the major states sitting 
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, India does not yet see Australia as an “indispensible 
partner” in the Asia Pacific.    
 
There have been irritations in recent years that have created political difficulties for New 
Delhi in developing the relationship with Australia.   Assaults on Indian vocational students 
studying in Melbourne in 2008-09 became a major source of controversy among the Indian 
public.  But the greatest irritant in the security relationship has been the uranium issue.  
Despite the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement reached in 2007, Australia was slow to 
fully accommodate India’s new status as a nuclear power outside of the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime.   Australia has a longstanding policy banning the export of 
uranium to any state that is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.   This 
policy reflected the politically controversial nature of uranium mining and exports in 
Australia and Australia’s enthusiasm for supporting international non-proliferation norms.   
Australia’s refusal to supply uranium was taken by New Delhi as indicating a lack of 
commitment to the relationship and a refusal to acknowledge India’s great power status.   
For several years, this stand-off reduced any enthusiasm by the Indian government for 
closer relations.  However, Australia’s agreement in December 2011 to exempt India from 
its policy removed an important political roadblock for the Indian government to further 
developments in the relationship and the terms of a uranium supply agreement are now 
being finalised. 
 
Despite hesitations in the political relationship, over the last decade the economic 
relationship has been expanding rapidly, and India is becoming one of Australia’s most 
important trading partners.   Bilateral trade was around US$18 billion in 201214 and is 
expected to double  over the next 5 years.  This has made India Australia’s fourth largest 
export partner after China, Japan and the United States.  Australian exports to India are 
dominated by resources (primarily coal, gold and copper) and education services.  Resource 
exports, including coal, minerals and natural gas, are expected to grow significantly in 
coming years and Australia is likely to become one of India’s major energy suppliers.  
However, Indian exports to Australia are growing at a much slower rate.   There is also 
considerable room for growth in bilateral investment which is relatively undeveloped.  
Indian investments in Australian resources sector have been growing over the last several 
years, although Australian mining companies have been deterred by restrictive Indian 
foreign investment laws from making significant investments in India’s mining sector.  A 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement has been under negotiation since 2011 
and this is likely to be given renewed focus by both sides during 2014.   When implemented, 
this should facilitate a much greater degree of economic interdependence. 
 
The convergence of Australian and Indian interests in the Asia Pacific:  prospects for 
cooperation   
 
Developments in the India-Australia relationship since the turn of the century reflect an 
underlying congruence of strategic interests of Australia and India in the Indian Ocean 
region and the Asia Pacific.  Many of these shared interests intersect in Southeast Asia. 
 
The rise of China 
 
China is  a significant factor underlying this convergence of interests.  India and Australia, 
along with many Southeast Asian states, have concerns about the growth of China’s 
political, economic and military power in the region.  They have a strong interest in seeing a 
balanced role for China in the Asia Pacific, particularly in Southeast Asia.   ASEAN states are 
encouraging both India and Australia to play a more active security role in Southeast Asia as 
a way of promoting a “balanced” distribution of power in the region.   
 Both India and Australia are responding to the changing balance of power in Southeast Asia 
through enhancing their military capabilities in the region and seeking opportunities for 
greater defence cooperation with ASEAN states.   In recent years the Indian Navy has given 
increased emphasis to its Eastern Fleet and has constructed new naval and air facilities in 
the Andaman Islands, near the western end of the Malacca Strait.  Australia is rebalancing 
its defence resources from its Pacific coast to northern and western Australia.15  Australia is 
also strengthening security cooperation with the United States, including inviting regular 
rotations of US marines through Darwin in northern Australia and the increased use of 
northern Australia for training by US ground and air forces.  There is also speculation about 
the increased use of Fremantle (near Perth) by the US Navy and access to an upgraded 
airstrip on the Cocos Islands.    
 
However, there are some differences in Australian and Indian perceptions about China.   
Many in New Delhi still remember India’s defeat by China in the 1962 war and China’s 
territorial claims over large portions of Indian-administered territory continue to be a major 
concern.  Many also see China’s “all weather friendship” with Pakistan as being essentially 
motivated by a desire to keep India off balance in South Asia.   The size and strategic 
aspirations of India means that it naturally sees itself as a peer competitor and perhaps, a 
strategic rival, of China.   Some believe that Southeast Asia could become a key focus of 
strategic rivalry between those countries. 
 
Australia’s relationship with China is somewhat different.   Australia is geographically distant 
from China and has a much smaller population.  Although they fought on opposite sides in 
the Korean War, there is little memory of direct military conflict between them.   Since 
2007, China has become Australia’s major trading partner and Chinese companies now hold 
significant stakes in Australia’s resources sector.   The strength of the Australian economy 
during the current world recession is very much dependent on China.   Some influential 
Australian analysts see the rise of China less in terms of a direct threat, and more as part of 
a long term strategic shift in East Asia, to which Australia will need to adapt in one way or 
another.16  These differences in perception mean that Australian concerns about China tend 
to be in less “zero sum” terms than sometimes appears to be the case in New Delhi.   For 
example,   Australian commentators tend to treat claims about the so-called “String of 
Pearls” in the Indian Ocean with a considerable degree of scepticism, generally seeing 
China’s activities in the Indian Ocean as reflecting its growing interests in the region.  
Australia would probably see Sino-Indian strategic rivalry either in Southeast Asia or the 
Indian Ocean as detrimental to its interests.  Although Australia is keen to develop its 
strategic relationship with India, it is cautious about placing the relationship primarily in the 
context of China.  Australia would like to see India develop as a friendly power to balance 
China’s rise, but would not wish to position itself as trying to contain China.  Although China 
is a material factor in the bilateral relationship, it would be a mistake to frame the India-
Australia relationship in Southeast Asia primarily in terms of China.    
 
Other shared interests in Southeast Asia 
 
India and Australia have numerous other shared security interests in Southeast Asia.  These 
include shared interests in maritime security (including piracy, people smuggling and 
maritime terrorism) and both India and Australia would wish to see improvements in the 
maritime security capabilities of ASEAN states.  Both have significant concerns about the 
growth of Islamic terrorist movements in several Southeast Asian countries, and both have 
significant stakes in the maintenance of the political stability in the region – particularly in 
the Muslim majority states of Indonesia and Malaysia.  Both Australia and India want to see 
the maintenance of secularist traditions in those countries. The installation of an Islamist 
regime in Indonesia, for example, would be a matter of considerable concern.    India and 
Indonesia were established as secular states including diverse religious beliefs, languages 
and traditions. Indonesia’s relatively tolerant (or syncretic) Islamic tradition, infused with 
mystical Sufi beliefs, has many links with the Islamic Sufi traditions practiced in India.   The 
advent of an Islamist and non-secular Indonesia could have major ramifications for India’s 
internal stability.   Similarly Australia would likely see such a development as adverse to the 
security of the region and Australia. 
 
Australia and India are making tentative moves to jointly engage with Indonesia.   This 
includes the establishment of a “troika” of past, present and future chairs of the Indian 
Ocean Rim Association (IORA)17  in an effort to set a new agenda for IORA and inject more 
life into the organisation.   India, Australia and Indonesia will also act as past, present and 
future chairs of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which is a biennial meeting of 
regional heads of navy, again in the hope of establishing a common agenda for that 
grouping.   A Trilateral Indian Ocean Dialogue has also been established between the three 
countries.   All these groupings create new opportunities for three-way dialogue among 
India, Australia and Indonesia and, potentially, for cooperation in maritime security-related 
areas.   However, there are perceptions that Indonesia has been slow to take advantage of 
these opportunities and still remains largely ASEAN-focused. 
 
Prospects for cooperation in developing regional architecture 
 
Over the last decade or so, India and Australia have worked in parallel (if not necessarily 
together) to promote the development of open, inclusive and balanced regional groupings 
covering East Asia.    In developing the region’s political, economic and security architecture, 
India and Australia share many interests with ASEAN states, particularly to ensure that 
middle or emerging powers are not marginalised in the regional decision-making by major 
Asia Pacific powers such as the United States, China and Japan.  This was demonstrated by 
the strong support of most ASEAN states for the membership of India and Australia in the 
East Asia Summit.   While neither Australia nor India would readily admit it, they are both 
geographical and cultural outsiders to East Asia and neither are automatically accorded a 
place in regional fora.  Australia and India may find each other useful in advocating that 
regional fora adopt a broad and inclusive definition of “East Asia”.    
 
Raja Mohan suggests that expanded cooperation among India, ASEAN and Australia might 
be an important additional force in building a new order in East Asia.  He cites KM Panikkar 
who called for cooperation among India, Indonesia, Australia and Britain in building the post 
war order.18  Although such cooperation was precluded by India’s policies during the Cold 
War, it may be possible now.   However, one should not necessarily assume that a 
consensus exists between India and Australia on using ASEAN-centred institutions as the 
basis for regional security architecture.  Indian approach has been to support the extension 
of ASEAN-centred regional arrangements, while Australia has generally focussed somewhat 
less on ASEAN as a basis for institution building.  Nevertheless, India and Australia are both 
strong supporters of ASEAN, including efforts to maintain solidarity among its members in 
relation to the territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea.  Australia now sees 
India as having a valuable and legitimate security role in the region alongside the United 
States.   
 
Prospects for cooperation in maritime security 
 
There are numerous possibilities for cooperation between India, Australia and ASEAN states 
in enhancing maritime security in Southeast Asia.  These include in the areas of 
Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR), capacity building and in improving Maritime 
Domain Awareness. 
 
As the most capable navies of Indian Ocean littoral states, India and Australia have much to 
offer the region in HADR. India and Australia, along with the United States and Japan, were 
key players in the multilateral naval response effort to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.   This 
displayed India’s capabilities as an HADR provider to the region and earned India a 
considerable amount of regional goodwill.  It also represented a major turning point in 
Indian thinking about the potential for cooperation with other key maritime democracies in 
both the Indian and Pacific Oceans.   
 
Assistance in building the capacity of ASEAN states to provide maritime security is another 
fruitful area for cooperation between India and Australia. To date, India has largely focused 
its capacity building efforts in Southeast Asia on its longstanding political ally, Vietnam.  This 
has included the provision of training, spare parts for Soviet-vintage patrol craft and aircraft 
maintenance.   Australia has its focused capacity building efforts on Indonesia and the 
Philippines.   Since the 1970s, Australia has assisted in developing the capabilities of the 
Indonesian Navy, including providing coastal patrol ships and a squadron of Nomad sea 
coastal surveillance aircraft.   In recent years, Australia has actively expanded cooperation 
with both Indonesia and the Philippines on maritime security and counter-terrorism. This 
reflects the importance to Australia of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade between 
northwest Australia and China that passes through the Sulu and Celebes seas, where pirates 
and terrorist groups are active.  The focus on Indonesia also reflects geographical proximity 
and includes arrangements for border security and to counter illegal fishing.  Australia is also 
enhancing maritime security in the southern Philippines through funding improvements to 
sea surveillance systems, border controls and port security and has donated new patrol 
vessels to the Philippine Coast Guard.  Australia is also assisting the Philippines to achieve 
compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code for its international 
ports, and to implement a similar security regime for domestic ports and ships, with an 
emphasis on domestic passenger ferries and ports located on the southern island of 
Mindanao.19   
 
Indonesia would provide a potential focus for cooperation between India and Australia in 
regional capacity building.  As noted previously, India and Australia have made tentative 
efforts to jointly engage with Indonesia, including on areas related to maritime security.  
Indonesia has numerous requirements to build its maritime security capabilities, not least 
the need for modern vessels.  Other key requirements include aerial surveillance 
capabilities, coastal radar and support in the establishment of a Coast Guard Training 
Academy.20  Coordinated assistance by both India and Australia in these areas could 
maximise the benefits to Indonesia. 
 
Another potential area for cooperation in Southeast Asian/Indian Ocean maritime security is 
in improved Maritime Domain Awareness.  This would likely initially focus on the main 
straits used by shipping transiting the Indonesian archipelago.  In recent years, India has 
given significant focus to improving its Maritime Domain Awareness throughout the Indian 
Ocean region.   This has included considerable investment in maritime intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.  In July 2012 the Indian Navy opened a 
new Naval Air Station on Great Nicobar island, India’s nearest possession to the Malacca 
Strait, primarily for maritime surveillance activities.  Australia already has considerable 
maritime ISR capabilities throughout the eastern Indian Ocean in areas which abut or 
overlap with areas of strategic interest to India.   The Royal Australian Air Force has long 
played an active maritime surveillance role in Southeast Asia, including operating AP-3C 
Orion aircraft through Malaysia’s Butterworth Air Base as part of Operation Gateway.   
Australia is also considering developing the air field in the Cocos Islands to help expand its 
ISR capabilities in the region.   
 There are substantial opportunities for cooperation between India, Australia and key 
security partners in Southeast Asia in enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).   In 
coming years, both India and Australia will acquire Boeing P-8 maritime aircraft and (likely) 
Global Hawk UAVs (or its maritime variant) as the backbone of their maritime ISR 
capabilities.  This will create unprecedented opportunities for information sharing as well as 
for cooperation in training and maintenance.  It has been suggested that India and Australia 
could jointly sponsor a Regional Maritime Domain Partnership which would involve 
collaboration with Southeast Asian states in intelligence sharing, MDA and coordinated 
patrolling.21  A regional arrangement co-sponsored by India and Australia and including 
Southeast Asian maritime states such as Singapore, Indonesia and, perhaps, Malaysia, could 
be a useful way of advancing ISR cooperation while also satisfying Indian political 
sensitivities about regional security partnerships that do not necessarily involve direct 
reliance on the United States.22  The recent loss of Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 and the 
many problems faced by regional states in coordinating their search efforts is ample 
demonstration of the value of establishing regional cooperation arrangements in this area.  
 
The idea of the “Indo-Pacific” strategic region:  its significance for Australia’s and India’s 
roles in Southeast Asia   
 
In broader terms, the convergence of Indian and Australian strategic interests in Southeast 
Asia should be seen in light of the growing reconceptualisation of the links between the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans in strategic thinking.  Whereas the Indian and Pacific Oceans were 
once considered as largely autonomous regions in strategic terms, many analysts now see 
considerable strategic interaction between those regions.  Of course, Southeast Asia sits at 
the conjunction of these oceans. 
 
There is increasingly discussion within the security communities in Australia, India and the 
United States of an integrated, or at least interconnected, “Indo-Pacific” strategic region 
encompassing the entire Asian littoral running from northeast Asia to the Middle East and 
Africa. This is often primarily viewed in the maritime security dimension, particularly in 
connection with the security of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) running from the 
Middle East to northeast Asia, through which much of the world’s energy supplies are 
carried.   These security concerns cross the spectrum of state and non-state actors and 
traditional and non-traditional security concerns.  The Indo-Pacific strategic construct also 
reflects the expansion of China’s area of strategic interest into the Indian Ocean and a 
simultaneous expansion of India’s area of strategic interest into the Western Pacific.   China 
is developing economic and security relationships in the Indian Ocean (such as with 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Burma) while India is developing important economic and security 
relationships in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific generally.  This means that security 
interaction between India and China will increasingly span the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
 
The Indo-Pacific strategic concept has particular significance for India’s growing aspirations 
to play a significant security role in Southeast Asia, and the broader Asia Pacific region.  
Despite giving much greater prominence to security concerns in East Asia since the 1990s, 
India still faces some constraints in playing an expanded role in the Asia Pacific, reflecting 
geography, its lack of economic influence and its relatively short history of strategic 
engagement with the region.   For India, the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” could be a useful 
way of grouping India together with the key economic and military powers in the Western 
Pacific.  As former Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, commented, the use of the term 
Indo-Pacific in strategic discourse in India represents the recognition of the inclusion of the 
Western Pacific within the range of India’s security interests.23   
 
However, significant questions remain as to the practical consequences of this concept.  As 
former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, commented:  “How we translate the growing 
connection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans into an operational concept is a question 
that we need to answer if we are to adapt to the new challenges in the region.”24   Some see 
the Indo-Pacific strategic construct as a way of bringing India into closer strategic 
relationships with “liberal democratic” powers in the Asia Pacific (especially the United 
States, Japan and Australia), primarily to balance the growing power of China.   According to 
one report by influential Australian, Indian and US think tanks: 
 
“Liberal democratic powers in the Indo-Pacific share a strategic interest in enhancing 
a web of relationships that promote economic and political stability, security, 
continued free and open trade throughout the region, and democratic governance.  
U.S.-India-Australia trilateral cooperation should be a critical element of this 
underpinning.“25    
 
However, others see the idea of the Indo-Pacific in more inclusive terms, seeing shared 
security interests of all major powers, including China, in the littoral running from the 
Middle East, through Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia.   According to this view, the Indo-
Pacific as a concept is an opportunity for all interested powers to be recognised as 
legitimate stakeholders and cooperate in providing maritime security throughout the entire 
littoral.  Whatever way this strategic concept evolves, it may become an important driver in 
strategic thinking of the United States, India, Australia and other major powers.     
 
A change in US thinking about the strategic interrelationship of the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans is likely to have a significant impact on the US strategic relationships with both 
Australia and India as well as the Australia-India bilateral relationship.  The United States is 
increasingly adopting a strategic posture that seeks to address the security challenges facing 
the Asian littoral in an integrated manner. This includes a gradual shift in US defence 
resources from the Northwest Pacific towards the Southwest Pacific area (including 
Australia, Singapore and the Philippines). The US is also placing greater importance on India 
and Australia as security partners in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.  The United States 
would like to see India and Australia taking greater responsibility for security in the Indian 
Ocean, thereby, taking some of the strain off US resources in the Western Pacific.  The 
United States is also encouraging a closer working security relationship between India and 
Australia that covers both the Indian and Pacific theatres. 
 
The Indo-Pacific strategic concept has particular significance for India’s potential role in 
Southeast Asia.  This includes India playing a much greater security role in the Pacific Ocean 
and forming much closer security relationships with US allies such as Australia and Japan 
and others.  India is already gradually assuming a role in the South China Sea.  From India’s 
perspective there may be increased focus on cooperation with partners that form gateways 
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, including Australia, Singapore and potentially 
Indonesia.  By joining together in Southeast Asia, India and Australia could give greater form 
to a new Indo-Pacific region in which they will play major strategic roles. 
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